Common Cents Blog

Today the Democratic Party released its long awaited DNC Autopsy Report 2024 where they detailed the reasons they lost - despite a friendly media landscape and a $1.5 Billion to spend. It is interesting and you can read it here, or see excerpts below:

INTRODUCTION
In every election cycle, the two major parties and hundreds of outside groups invest enormous resources and energy trying to define the terrain for voter choice. What happens at the Presidential level certainly impacts down-ballot contests, yet candidates across the ballot in both parties will still seek to define choices for voters in their specific elections. From those choices, the voters decide which choice is most resonant. One party declares itself the winner, and the other party declares that the fight is far from finished. Effective parties, understanding history rarely repeats itself, it does often rhyme, make it a point to study electoral outcomes after each cycle to identify potential improvements to every aspect of their campaigns. John Adams argued “Liberty cannot be preserved without a general knowledge among the people, who have a right…and a desire to know.” This desire to know, to understand what is going well and needs to be maintained, along with understanding what is not working and needs to evolve, is at the heart of any substantive effort to evaluate the relative impact of strategies and tactics tied to a specific election cycle and specific candidate matchup in order to generate insights about what happened. A thorough review can provide a blueprint for future campaigns, establishing a series of “lessons learned” to drive continuous improvement in future efforts.
In this regard, the 2024 election was no different from any other. There were many dramatic moments framing the narrative of the national campaign, thousands of candidates seeking support from voters, and billions of dollars spent across the ballot and throughout the electoral ecosystem to advance particular interests. There are many books already written, and many more to come, presenting analyses of “what happened” for both sides, the efficacy of the strategies advanced, decisions made, and actions taken during the presidential campaign. These analyses, in order to present a thorough picture of the will of the people and the choices they made, must extend beyond the presidential campaign to include those strategies, decisions, and actions taken by other federal, state, and local candidates on ballots nationwide to examine why so many were able to succeed where others came up short. Understanding that “little d” democracy is the will of the people and “Big D” Democracy represents the systems and structures in place to advance or inhibit the will of the people, there must also be a review and analysis of the systemic and structural issues – some going back more han a decade – which have impacted electoral outcomes at every level. These issues can inhibit the evolution of Democracy, and limit the reach and success of the Democratic Party. Unfortunate reductions in support and training for our state parties, consequential shifts in voter registration, a loss of partisan organizing capacity, and a persistent inability or unwillingness to listen to all voters has provided the other major party with opportunities for advancement at the expense of Democratic growth, evolution, and ability to find common ground with seemingly disparate groups of voters from coast to coast, and the heartland Democrats tend to ignore. Historically, Democrats have held the advantage in each of these areas. The Democratic Party has always tried to be seen as the party of the people, the party of workers, fair play and civil discourse. The party’s connections with working Americans and their families were forged through decades of organizing and engagement, the development of a vibrant and inclusive party infrastructure, and a relatable agenda which helped us connect in homes, workplaces, and neighborhoods across the country. This report explores with depth and breadth how we lost these relationships by examining both candidate-specific circumstances and the overall trending away from effective and accountable politicking, and seeks to expound upon the combination of strategic, tactical, and organizational improvements Democrats need to form an effective and durable Majority Party Strategy. Why Now? Democracy is a very old institution, and yet what keeps democracy going is the ability of those who seek to lead to look at the data and determine the source of success as well as setbacks. This after-action report specifically aims to identify and elaborate upon the actions the Democratic Party must take after what happened in the 2024 cycle. The report identifies the programs and priorities for consideration and implementation to build our Party to win over the next ten years, and to again become the party of the people well into the future. This report includes a thorough evaluation of voter behavior in the context of the individual-level collection of voter contact data and localized demographic data. The analyses aim to identify gaps in participation, determine the correlation between the frequency and distribution of partisan voter contact, and declare the urgent steps needed to reclaim our strength in engaging voters across the nation. In simple terms, this report follows the money, identifying the top spenders and vendors in both parties, offering insights into where the money went, including who benefited and what issues were prioritized. From there, it presents an exploration of the context and composition of campaign spending for each office, the roles and impact of allied spending, and the volume of independent expenditures in the ecosystem. To examine the reach of the Party, this report evaluates comparative and competitive media spending, the mix of broadcast and digital investment, and the need for greater innovation and experimentation in sharing the Democratic story with more voters and to greater effect and impact. Finally, this report assesses the state of data and technology – with recommendations to ensure the security and resiliency of our critical infrastructure, and opportunities to improve tools and tech to meet the needs of modern, vibrant campaigns. A relevant and modern party must imbue its operations with resilient and robust digital operations to effectively present a unifying declaration to voters - “We the People” is not a new idea, but an enduring philosophy meant to include each generation and every available innovation in its design and operation. Methodology The report analyzes a range of publicly and commercially available data to identify actual investments, actions, and eventual voter behavior. The analysis also includes qualitative data obtained in the form of in-person and virtual interviews with more than 300 organizations and individuals who were promised confidentiality to encourage their participation and candor. Most participants were eager to share their recommendations for how Democrats can improve strategies, decision-making, and infrastructure. In parallel to this report, the DNC and ASDC have conducted more than 1200 interviews to assess the health of our 57 state parties – in every state, district, or territory. While some participants may agree in part and disagree in part with portions of this report, we thank all participants for their candor and contributions, and their enduring commitment to the oldest continuing political party in the United States.
Assessing the State of the Party
There are always hot takes after an election – but hot takes will lead to mistakes if we do not take the time to thoroughly explore what occurred, what worked well, and what should have been done better. We must be careful to draw the right lessons from this experience, and not miss opportunities to identify and build upon some of the positives from the 2024 cycle. Yes, many are deeply angry with the outcome of this most recent national election. They feel cheated, abused, and taken advantage of by a broken system. At the same time, we must acknowledge how close the margins actually were. 7,309 votes across three districts decided control of the US House of Representatives. 327,557 votes across four states decided the US Senate. And 270,607 votes across four states decided the Presidency – around two-tenths of one percent of all ballots cast for President. The 2020 cycle was also very close – a narrow win for the Presidency, a narrow Democratic majority in the House, and a tie in the Senate based on a runoff in Georgia. The 2016 cycle was also close at the presidential level – with a split between the popular vote and Electoral College (with seven faithless Electors). This demonstrates a basic truth – we have been and remain a nation divided. It is not unique to the 2024 election These hair-splitting margins of defeat may lead some to argue Democrat leadership and candidates may need less changing of their message and approach and more massaging of their ideas for widespread adoption. The arguments have run nonstop since November 2024 – with a better political climate, or advancing slightly different policies, or with a different candidate, victory could have been assured. This kind of thinking – denialist at its core – prevents the Party from seeking real accountability, and from making the changes we need to deliver on our promises to the American people. To grow, we must admit and accept some hard truths about our Party. Since the high point of the 2008 Obama landslide, when he received nearly 10 million more votes than John McCain, the Democratic Party has vacillated between stagnation and retrogression. In doing so, we have lost the confidence we once received from everyday Americans – and election results show it.
The 2024 National Campaign
The initial research structure of the Presidential campaign started on the analytics side, with departmental leaders starting on the DNC payroll as consultants in the late spring of 2023, and rolling over to the campaign shortly thereafter. The analytics team created a series of products for different campaign departments and leadership needs. They supported grassroots fundraising and compliance, digital advertising, and state operations. They deployed large-scale panels for ongoing active listening, and could periodically explore reactions to ideas or breaking questions. They also managed the ad testing for the campaign, generating reports and audience lists for the campaign paid media team and campaign leadership; and evaluations of campaign program effort and effectiveness. Their work guided resource allocation for the campaign – how many voters were needed to win in a given state, and how many voters in a given set of states would lead to 270 electoral votes.
From the outset, the campaign set three targeting priorities. There were “re-engagement targets” – voters who had supported Obama or Biden, but were infrequent voters who needed persuasion to vote and to vote for Biden and then Harris – mostly younger voters or voters of color. There were “traditional swing voters,” these are voters who have largely moved towards Democrats in the Trump era, mostly college educated suburban voters who were not field targets, but were tracked for support. The third and smallest target group was “peel-away Trump voters,” who had perhaps voted for Trump in 2016 or 2020, but may have been with Democrats on abortion or who were alienated with the chaos and corruption of the Trump era. Trump’s favorability was tracking ahead of 2016 and 2020, especially in the Sun Belt, so they campaign felt they needed to take a run at these voters to drive his numbers down.
The analytics team reported there was little movement throughout the campaign – and the state teams struggled to meet contact and support goals. The analytics showed the race was characterized by stability – it remained tightly competitive throughout the general election. The “message polling” team was not fully onboarded until December of 2023. Comprised of three experienced polling firms and an expert qualitative firm, the pollsters described their work as underutilized during their initial engagement. They performed their work, and delivered their findings to campaign leadership, but there was limited feedback or discussion on their work product. Before the candidate switch, the pollsters never reviewed ad copy or content – and commented how they did not see ads until after they were airing, in some instances reading about the ads in the media. They also reported they had little insight into the data provided to leadership from the analytics team. As the June 2024 debate neared, there were discussions about polling around the debate and after the convention. The polling team was informed the plan was for them to poll three times during the general election, and the post-convention polling would count as one of those three polling waves. They attributed this minimalist approach to research to members of the media team not believing polling data was essential to decision making. The debate obviously changed many things. The dial-testing during the debate demonstrated the weakness of the President’s performance, and a post-debate survey was scrapped. The analytics team measured voter reaction, and reported seeing little change. The fundamental need to earn votes from the target audiences remained, and there was no positive movement towards the campaign. Post-debate, and about a week before the candidate switch, there were internal discussions about how to prepare a campaign for the Vice President. In 2020, when Kamala Harris was selected by President Biden to serve as the running mate, many voters were excited and curious.
An incumbent Vice President.
With no research to share once she became the nominee. The White House did not position or prepare the Vice President. Had the White House explored and evaluated ways to leverage Kamala Harris earlier in the administration, perhaps it would have improved the President’s standing, and it certainly could have helped prepare her to lead the ticket. Any fair critic of the Vice President has to acknowledge the strength and ability she demonstrated as the nominee. The idea that a prepared and supported Vice President could not have helped the President in the preceding three and a half years is a significant failure of imagination. Once the candidate switch was announced, the polling team quickly scrambled to get into the field with three studies – one on the Vice President’s biography and record, one on her vision and plan, and another on attacks and responses. Members of the Vice President’s team were tapped to reconstruct and update their own self-research from 2019, but even they were unclear

Read the rest of the DNC Autopsy Report Here.

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